The Life Cycle of FisheriesCourtland L. SmithABSTRACTFisheries are viewed as organisms that have a life cycle. The typical life cycle begins with an initial emphasis on foodproduction, next a growing interest in recreation develops, and finally comes aesthetic uses. As commercial productivityand the number of commercial and recreational users increases, conservation requires more stringent managementmeasures. Food production opportunities decline and recreation uses expand. Substituting cultured stocks for naturalones increases the quantity of fish available, but usually the life cycle process continues. To adjust to life cycle andevolutionary changes, management needs to separate conservation decisions from allocation issues, manage to includeas much of the stock's range as possible, control effort growth, and keep expectations reasonable.Perspectiveince the 1940s, theory in fishery biology has developedconcepts for managing fisheries. The models, e.g., sur-plus production, yield per recruit, stock and recruitment,and stock life history (Tyler and Gallucci 1980), try to esti-mate the maximum catch, usually called the maximum sus-tainable yield (MSY), that does not damage the long-termproductivity of the fish stock.Economic analysis of fishery management adds the be-havior of users and shows that it is possible to be at themaximum sustainable yield, but still not use effort in thefishery most efficiently. Maximum economic yield (MEY)promotes the most efficient utilization of fishing effort. This,like MSY, tries to hold a fishery at some optimal steady state.From these two perspectives, the fishery managementproblem is to control the common property nature of fishing,where individual incentives are detrimental to long-termresource protection and profitability. Management mea-sures typically introduce gear restrictions and reduce fishingtime in an attempt to keep catch and effort where they willnot do long-term resource damage. Restricting gear and timemeans that equipment is not used as effectively nor as longas designed. The result is excess fishing capacity and failureto meet the maximum economic yield criterion. As fishingeffort increases, setting rules becomes controversial and oftenthe management measures fail to even protect desired fishstocks.What if the fishery is viewed not statically, but as anorganism? Organisms evolve and they have life cycles. Ev-olution is the general changes in an organism's form as itadapts to new environmental conditions. In studying anorganism's life cycle, the objective is to determine the se-quence of changes through all the organism's develop-mental stages. The problem with a fishery may be relatedto some transition it is making in its life cycle.Life Cycle PatternsFisheries go through a general pattern in terms of humanuses. This pattern is a sequence punctuated by significantCourtland L. Smith is a professor in the Department of An-thropology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331.20changes, like the human life cycle, with the events unfoldingthrough time as the fishery matures. The life cycle of afishery is an ideal, in the sense that the sequence is alteredby changes in production methods, management ap-proaches, and the role of fisheries in society.The major stages in the life cycle of a fishery consist ofan initial emphasis on fod production, then a growing in-terest in recreation, with aesthetic uses developing last (Fig.1). The life cycle of fisheries is a generalized pattern. Undercertain conditions, stages in the life cycle of a fishery maynot occur.When initiated, a fishery struggles to find a market niche.Consumers for the fish catch have to be found. Appealingto consumers' preferences for lower prices and/or betterquality, the fishery tries to establish its market niche, andthe quantity caught grows (Fig. 1). If consumers are at-tracted, they generate incentives for fishers to catch more.Fishing effort, represented by the number of user units,expands and the catch grows toward the stock's MSY. Beinga natural resource, the amount of the stock that can becaptured is limited. If catches increase beyond MSY, theresult is reduced future productivity of the fish stock. Cou-pling an absolute limit with the cultural and personal driveof fishers to be more productive, means that once MSY isexceeded, the fishery supports fewer people or less efficientuse of fishing capacity.A simplified example illustrates this stage in the life cycleof a fishery. Assume there is a fishery in which the maximumsustainable yield averages 100,000 MT per year. If 100 fishingunits operate at their maximum capacity, their annual catchwould average 1,000 MT. Since improving efficiency of pro-duction is a desirable goal, assume that this improvementtakes place at an average rate of 2% per year. If this rate ofincrease in productivity took place for 35 years, the averagefishing unit would be capable of catching 2,000 MT. But thefishery can only support, on average, a maximum sustain-able yield of 100,000 MT. Now, 35 years later, only 50 fishingunits are needed, or each of the 100 fishing units still op-erating can be fished at only half capacity.Assume this hypothetical fishery operates in a society of1,000,000 people, and this society grows at the rate of 2%per year. In 35 years the population doubles. Fishers startedas one ten-thousandth of the population. If people chooseFisheries, Vol. 11, No. 4fishing at the same rate as in the past, after 35 years, therewill be 100 new fishing units. Each fishing unit now has anaverage capacity of 2,000 MT. With only 100,000 MT avail-able, 200 fishing units could average only 500 MT, one-fourthof the average capacity. To preserve the resource againsttwice ity, requires the fishing rules units reducing who more of fishing have grown time. a part-time occupation. This to twice makes fishingthe capac-Fishers fisheries must enter or activities.otherRecreational uses of the fishery develop erate additional next. They gen-user units. A user unit is an effort measurethat standardizes tional, and the effort aesthetic uses. given to commercial, recrea-Recreational uses involve muchlarger numbers of people than commercial fishing, but theaverage recreation time each person effort spends is is greater than less. In the aggregate,commercial (Fig. 1). Aes-thetic uses expand fish stock over recreational.the numbers of people interested in theWith more people using the fish stock, a decision has tobe made regarding the number who can be supported each activity. inWith democratic decision-making, use rightsusually go to the most numerous. Anglers who develop interest anin the fishery for its pleasure or subsistence valuetypically outnumber vantage commercial leads to the fishers. This numerical life cycle pattern ad-of shifting from foodproduction to recreational uses (Fig. 1).The general evolutionary state of society influences life thecycle process. Technological innovation ploitative changes the ex-power of commercial fishing as illustrated in theexample above. Food production that leaves time for leisurepursuits, the recognition that recreation renews people'sproductive energy, and aesthetic appreciation are in all factorsthe general state of cultural evolution that call for nonfooduses of fish populations.Aesthetic interests develop after recreation. For aestheticuses the quantity is not consumed but reserved group's aesthetic appreciation. for someMarine sanctuaries, publicview areas at fish ladders, legislation having protection asthe primary purpose, reservation of portions of stocks pri-marily for viewing, preservation of wild stocks, and and-release fisheries catch-are examples where aesthetics havebecome a primary consideration.0U.se.Figure available 1. for a Generalized hypothetical life fishery, cycle process and showing totalfor the relative sharescommercial, recreational, and aesthetic uses as thenumber of users increases.July-August 1986Aesthetic consumption is that portion of the stock re-served for nonconsumptive purposes. Many aesthetic usesare compatible with commercial the stock declines to and recreational a very low uses. level as a result Whenof excessivefishing effort, or more often, due to destruction of the entire stock habitat,is usually reserved for aesthetic purposes.Preservation of whales, porpoises, and restoring New Eng-land stocks of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) aesthetic are cases in whichconcerns have become primary. Aesthetic interestsrestored Atlantic salmon in streams where they were onceextinct.Experience with many wildlife populations illustrates thesame life cycle for resource use. The food that these wildlifeonce provided now comes from domesticated stocks. Deerpopulations may be larger than ever before in North Amer-ica, but they provide mainly recreation and do not serve asbasic subsistence in any substantial way. Deer herds illus-trate management to meet both recreational and aestheticinterests. Wildfowl populations, once commercially hunted,provide mainly recreation. Management of migratory birdflyways increasingly provides for aesthetic uses. Marketgunning brought extinction to the passenger pigeon, just as19th century market pressures and subsequent habitat de-cline put the shortnose sturgeon (Acipenser brevirostrum) the endangered onspecies list (Reiger 1977).One reason for the life cycle shift from fishing for food recreation, toto aesthetic uses, is the overall value cies to of the spe-society. When highly valued stocks become rare,preservation assumes a very high value. Nelson (1982) es-timates the social cost to protect pairs of spotted owls at$250,000 in lost timber revenues. Bishop (1980) estimates thetotal 1974 social costs of protecting California condors at$3,200,000. Aesthetic appreciation of non-game birds wasestimated to have a half billion dollar value in 1974 (DeGraffand Payne 1975). Through 1983, duck stamps brought in$285 million to purchase 3.5 million acres for refuges (Mad-son 1984). The snail darter (Percina tanasi) is one of the mostcontroversial fish species protected Species under the EndangeredAct.Breaking the PatternThe life cycle pattern for fisheries is a generalized set ofstages. Departures from the typical pattern help elaboratethe features of this process. Certainly fisheries that do notdevelop a recreational or aesthetic constituency are muchmore susceptible to at least economic extinction, and even-tually total extinction, maining biomass since the is not likely to attract effort broad to preserve interest. the Con-re-sumers switch to other products, fishers take otheroccupations, and without cates an aesthetic component, for the fish stock are advo-absent.At least one species, the Miller Lake lamprey (Lampetraminima), was exterminated because it preyed on recreation-ally important trout in the Klamath River system (Robins etal. 1980). The Miller Lake lamprey never constituted a fish-ery, never having a population of users who about its existence.were concernedNineteenth century commercial fishing in the is an illustration Great Lakesof the life cycle process. The shortnosesturgeon was initially viewed as a nuisance. These fish piled wereon the bank Later, when the sturgeon's and burned (Reiger value for caviar, and Hartman isinglass, 1973).and21food was demonstrated, they were overfished. Likewise,overfishing and habitat change led to extinction of the bluepike (Stizostedion vitreum glaucum). Subsequently, fish cul-ture and management recreated many Great Lakes fisheries.The user population is now mainly recreational.Some suggest the life cycle pattern only applies to fishstocks high on the food chain. Will northern anchovy (En-graulis mordax), mackerel (Scomber scombrus), or Alaskan pol-lack (Theragra chalcogramma) ever experience this life cycle?The Pacific Fishery Management Council's (1983) anchovymanagement plan reserves a portion of the stock as food for\"attracting and maintaining stocks of recreationally impor-tant marine fish species.\" Management options also con-sider the role of anchovies as feed for the brown pelican.The Mid-Atlantic Council's (1985) draft Atlantic mackerel,squid, and butterfish plan allocates a portion of the Atlanticmackerel to the recreational fishery and recognizes the placeof Atlantic mackerel in the forage of endangered species ofmarine mammals and other recreationally important spe-cies. Pollack, which populate North Pacific waters well awayfrom population centers, are not likely to become the basisfor a recreational fishery. They are still subject to overex-ploitation due to commercial overfishing, as are many otherresources which once were perceived as inexhaustible.More interesting than the efficacy of the life cycle analogyare the actions humans undertake to change this pattern.Primary among these is intervention in the reproductionprocess to increase the quantity of fish available. Fisherymanagement tries to hold the life cycle in one place. Re-strictions on the number of users, encouraging alternativeactivities, and changing people's expectations, too, are waysto alter the life cycle pattern.Evolutionary ProcessesContrasting fishing activities with the general pattern ofhuman evolution shows that most food produced for humanconsumption comes from cultivation techniques. Fishing isa capture rather than culture method of production, and thelife cycle analogy assumes a resource whose productivity islimited by natural factors.The terrestrial evolutionary pattern of the last 10,000 yearshas been to change the method of food production by do-mesticating important plants and animals that serve as basicsubsistence foods. The development of agriculture and an-imal husbandry not only greatly increases plant and animalproductivity, but extends control to productive plant andanimal populations by enabling clear demarcation and con-trol.Domestication enables control of resource production andgives producers the benefits of their effort to produce more.H. Scott Gordon (1954) extended this concept to fisheries.Gordon patterned his pioneering bioeconomic theory on theevolutionary process for human food production. In fact,Gordon (1954, p. 134) acknowledges, \"The results of an-thropological investigation of modes of land tenure amongprimitive peoples render some further support to this the-sis.\"The evolution from capture to culture has been going onfor first 3,000 became years popular, for some produces fish. China, more where than a fish third culturingof theirfish by aquaculture (Ling 1977; National Marine Fisheries22Service 1984). In Taiwan, 16% of the fish production in 1974came from aquaculture (Chen 1976). Japanese fish produc-tion peaked in the early 1970s at just over 10 million MT.The ratio of cultured fish increased from less than 4% toover 9% of the total between 1950 and 1979 (Kafuka andIkenoue 1983). Norwegian Atlantic salmon production in1984 was equivalent to 1.5 times the average annual catchin the sockeye salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka) fishery of BristolBay, and Norwegian salmon significantly impact fresh salmonmarkets. The North American rainbow trout (Salmo gaird-neri) recreational fishery is built on hatchery innovations ofthe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.As the maximum sustainable yield is exceeded, and if thefishery is important to society, culturing has the potentialfor increasing quantities, despite reduction of natural pop-ulations due to excessive use or habitat destruction. Thisprocess is illustrated in Figure 2. For a threatened fishery tosurvive as an important food resource, it has to evolve fromcapturing fish to culturing. This changes the natural patternsof productivity, and the quantity available is greatly in-creased. Wild stocks lose out in the competition with do-mesticated ones, sometimes merging into a genetically mixedstock (Reiger 1977). With control of the production, culturingholds the potential for producing enough fish to meet com-mercial and recreational needs. The life cycle pressure ofmore and more fishers seeking fewer and fewer fish is easedwith the greater productivity possible from fish culture.ManagementWhen changes are judged to be detrimental, a commonresponse is to manage the fishery. Fishery management triesto hold the life cycle of a fishery at one point. The decisionmay be to preserve a commercial fishery, or to maintain amix of commercial, recreational, and aesthetic uses. Usuallythe goals of management are based on a conception of thefishery as it was at some time in the past. Of 25 stocksmanaged under the Magnuson Act, Finch (1985) reportseight did not change their status in the 9 years since 1975.The condition of six stocks deteriorated when compared topast conditions. Eleven species groups showed improve-ment, which meant an improved ability to support historicuses.Management addresses two primary concerns-conser-0U.ersFigure 2. Contribution of fishing natural stocks andgrowth of fish culture as the number of users increasein a hypothetical fishery.Fisheries, Vol. 11, No. 4vation of the resource and allocation of the amount availableto various users. Public support for conservation is wide-spread. It is an easily understood objective which peoplebelieve to be in their long-term self-interest. are not Even directly affected, if theythe public sees the value of con-servation. Conservation, then, is a clear and primary objec-tive. Allocation It has strong of public who will support.catch the fish involves dividing available thecatch among fishing groups. fishery pattern The life cycle shows how of athis is difficult management to achieve. tends Sinceto be dominated by allocations were in the past, as theyit is often out of step with the the fishery life cycle which ofis changing toward and greater recreationalaesthetic use (Finch 1985).Clarity in management would Conservation be enhanced and Management if Act the Fisheryspecifically guished in distin-the objectives and standards that is a process managementof first conservation and then allocation. Thiscould be accomplished in the standards 1851) by replacing section (16 \"management\" U.S.C.every time it occurs the word \"allocation.\" with\"Conservation and acceptable for management\" emphasis isin the act's title, is but managementthe process of both conservation Fishery and allocation.managers do not generally conceive of as allocating themselvesfish among users. They would rather be conservators theof the resource for is the public, a long history although of fishing theregroups lobbying and allocations legislatingto themselves. Allocation of salmon included is explicitlyin the Pacific Fishery Management Council's salmonmanagement plan. The plan follows the life cycle pattern.When numbers of coho salmon go (0. kusutch) to commercial are large, fishers. When 86%the numbers small, the of coho percentage arereverses and anglers are allocated mostof the available fish (Pacific 1984, p. 32421).Fishery Management CouncilStock ConservationOne of the factors reducing ment the effectiveness decisions of is lack of manage-control over fish stock. the full range When of themanagement does not users, control all additional potentialpeople enter the fishery. People the control beyondof management continue add the life cycle to the number process.of users andWhere political boundaries those on one crosscut the side of the fish stock's range,boundary can operate with the bestof conservation intentions, but unless the other also, conservation regulations side doeswill not boundaries be respected. for conservation Thedecisions will be most effectiveif they encompass the territory of the fish stock.Another reason for making the management boundariessynonymous with in fish productivity. the fish stock Different is the inherent temperatures, variabilityoceanographicconditions, and other factors affect reproduction Uncertainty and growth.in environmental conditions stock sizes makes predictingmore difficult. stitution Where is able to the decision-making in-year and follow to monitor fish stock variability from year tostock will stock conditions, be better known. the that Historical condition increased records of thenumbers help of users are showstock.adversely affecting theIdeally, management institutions changes critical need to the to control fish stock. In habitatmost cases, forestry,July-August 1986navigation, agriculture, waste disposal, and dam construc-tion have priority over fisheries. These economic activitiesalter fish habitats the case and when lower productivity. the fish stock is This is most at the aesthetic oftenend of its lifecycle.The Analogy of the FirmEconomic theory applied to fishery management is animportant allocation to maintain tool, particularly a viable commercial where the fishery. The objective isfirm, analogy where is thethe sole owner behaves In a to maximize common profits.property setting each fisher acts independ-ently of what is good for the whole, and the sum vidual of indi-behaviors results in resource decline from overfish-ing. The solution, a property following right. Gordon This (1954), puts those is to establishowner, fishing having the in the position economic ofincentive that maximize to make decisionsthe long-term value of returns from the fish-ery. Property rights for fisheries English follow enclosure the examples movement during of thelution the Industrial and Revo-barbed wire fencing of Great Plains farms. Bothstimulated greater production by protecting the from external fenced forces and landsfrom enabling their innovativeness.landowners to benefitEstablishing property rights in a fishery is not as simpleas fencing. To receive good the management, economic ownership benefit of must be exerted long-termwhole stock. Keen over the(1983, p. 211) states \"formalizes that limited rights entryto harvest ... These problems rights associated fail to correctwith the commons impediments and create to seriousefforts made to restore ductivity and enhance of fishery pro-resources.\" The problem with fisheriesis that the unit is not as easily.divided as is the fencing offarms.The private property solution requires some passing, more usually encom-government, agency to set the number ofusers that can most profitably operate in the fishery and notoverfish the resource. Auctioning make the allocation quotas decision, lets the but unless the managementmarketagency has control over all the effort in the fishery or theentire fishery is auctioned to one sole owner, those operatingin the fishery have no incentive to conserve the stock. Evenif some market mechanism is designed to provide the in-centive for fishermen to conserve the stock, the destructionof fish habitat from societal growth servation overwhelms effort.the con-The costs of managing a complex multi-user fishery arequite high (Wilson 1982). in obtaining Considerable information, expense is incurredfacilitating and defending public participation,legal challenges to tion conservation decisions. and alloca-Support is usually inadequate management for and effectivethe life cycle process continues accordingto pattern. When the fishery consists of multiple species,the problems and costs are compounded.Transition to Other EmploymentDue to unwillingness to allocate catch, inability to the full controlrange of the stock, number of and difficulty users, the life controlling cycle process theopportunities continues and reducesfor commercial fishers to participate full-time.(Continued)23Successful fishery management coordinates with programsthat promote other alternatives for fishers and fishing com-munities.Economic growth, tax, loan, and other incentives stimu-late growth in the number of fishers. When a fishery reachesits maximum sustainable yield, these incentives are still inplace. The incentives continue to attract more effort whennone is needed. Rather than incentives to enter fishing,mechanisms are required to promote transition into othereconomic activities where there is opportunity.The capture-to-culture evolutionary process creates op-portunities, but not for commercial fishing. With more users,the typical pattern is for resource use to shift from foodproduction to recreation. The ratio of total catch taken byangling increases. With still more users, aesthetic, noncon-sumptive activities take precedence. This does not help thefishers and communities where commercial fishing is thefoundation of their economic enterprise. Where other eco-nomic opportunities are limited, fishers will pursue com-mercial fishing, even if this is not in the long-term bestinterest of the fish stock. Without competitive employmentopportunities, the only choice is continued erosion of thecurrent fishery.Keeping Expectations ReasonableSocial science research shows that fishing is an attractiveoccupation (Pollnac and Littlefield 1984). Fishing providesfreedom, allows people to be their own boss, gives the op-portunity to be involved with nature, and provides a \"totalexperience.\" These personal advantages generate expecta-tions about fishing. Positive expectations produce incentivesthat motivate people to take up fishing.Where the culture associated with commercial fishing addsto the appeal associated with this occupation, this, too, pro-motes more fishing effort. Literary tradition glorifies fishingexperiences and opportunities. The symbols are emphasizedin Winslow Homer's art, Herman Melville's writing, andJohn Masefield's poetry. The desire to challenge nature asa fisher and to live in a picturesque fishing community cre-ates images that make overfishing difficult to control. Theseexpectations are unreasonable given the life cycle pattern offisheries.Expectations can be controlled by reminding fishers aboutthe resource's status. Regular reporting to fishery partici-pants of change in fishing effort, catch per unit of effort,the ratio of catch from commercial fishing and angling, andthe ratio of capture to culture harvest helps remind peopleof where the fishery is in its life cycle.SummaryThe life cycle of a fishery is a progression of uses startingwith commercial, then adding recreational, and finally aes-thetic. Near the end of the life cycle, the fish stock is rela-tively small and the use primarily aesthetic. This flow ofevents is driven by growth in the number of people usingthe fish stock and economic activities external to the fisherythat The reduce life cycle the process stock's habitat.is difficult to redirect. Fish culturing,fishery management, and the role of the fishery in the socialsystem alter the process. Human 10,000 years history is the with land basis for plantsand animals over the last pre-dicting a similar evolution in the pattern of capture fishingto culturing techniques. This evolution may ease the tran-sition, but also brings a shift in the users. Fish culturing ismore like farming.Fishery management tries to slow or stop the life cycleprocess. Management is a two-part process of conservationand allocation. There is broad public support for conser-vation. Allocation is a complex decision where the situationsof people are evaluated against societal goals.Conservation decisions are best where the managementsystem and the fish stock boundaries are synonymous. Thisenables a conservation decision which can encompass thegreatest number of factors affecting the resource. Allocationdecisions are based on economic, social, and political con-siderations.One recommendation is to create private property rightsfor individual fishers. The supposition is that property rightsmake users more sensitive to the conservation needs of thefish stock. Each person having a private property right, how-ever, is not analogous to the small firm where the sole ownermakes decisions to maximize profits for a productive system.For private property to stimulate conservation, some man-agement organization or fishing enterprise needs to be thesole owner. Management systems are very costly, in somecases their cost exceeds the economic benefit that manage-ment is designed to produce.Providing alternative opportunities and keeping expec-tations reasonable ease the life cycle process. Both ease userpressure.A fishery is a dynamic, changing organism. It must copewith the processes of growth in society and pressures forincreased numbers of users. With a limited resource andmore users, the alternatives are to either allow each user totake less or to reduce the number of users. Evolution of fishculturing can produce more fish, but changes the characterof the fishery. Management tries to maintain past user pat-terns. Emphasizing conservation, covering the stock's fullrange, promoting other opportunities, and keeping expec-tations reasonable all ease pressures on the life cycle process.Not achieving these management objectives, in a growingsociety, means the life cycle process will continue to bedriven by increased numbers of users.AcknowledgmentsThis work was supported, in part, by the National SeaGrant College Program, NOAA, Department of Commerce,and the citizens of Oregon. The questions and commentsof Clem Bribitzer, Shirley Fiske, Peter Fricke, Barry Johnson,Linda Varsell Smith, Claire Younger; and an anonymousreviewer were very helpful. I benefited from discussion ata Marine Policy and Ocean Management Seminar at theWoods Hole Oceanographic Institution and \"Holistic Ap-proach to Oceans\" session of the Society for Applied An-thropology. >_ReferencesBishop, R. C. 1980. Endangered species: an economic perspective.Trans. N. Am. Wildl. Nat. Resour. Conf. 45:211-212.Chen, T. P. 1976. Aquaculture practices in Taiwan. Page Bros. Ltd.,Norwich, England.DeGraff, R. N., and B. R. Payne. 1975. Economic values of non-game birds and some urban wildlife: research needs. Trans. N.Am. Wildl. Nat. Resour. Conf. 40:283.Finch, R. 1985. Fishery management under the Magnuson Act.Marine Policy 9:170-179.Gordon, H. S. 1954. The economic theory of a common propertyresource: the fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62(2):124-142.Kafuka, T., and H. Ikenoue. 1983. Modem methods of aquaculturein Japan. Kondansha Ltd., Tokyo, Japan.Keen, E. A. 1983. Common property in fisheries: is sole ownershipan option? Marine Policy 7(3):197-212.Ling, Shao-Wen. 1977. Aquaculture in Southeast Asia: a historicaloverview. University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA.Madson, J. 1984. A lot of trouble and a few triumphs for NorthAmerican waterfowl. National Geographic 166(5):562-594.Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council. 1985. Amendment #2to the fishery management plan for the Atlantic rtiackerel, squid,and butterfish fisheries. Hearing draft.National Marine Fisheries Service. 1984. U.S. fisheries trade withChina, 1979-83. Office of International Fisheries, Washington,DC.Nelson, R. H. 1982. The public lands. In Current Issues in NaturalResource Policy. Resources for the Future, Washington, DC.Pacific Fishery Management Council. 1983. Northern anchovy fish-ery management plan. Final Supplemental Environmental ImpactStatement, October 24, 1983. Pacific Fishery Management Coun-cil, Portland, OR.-- .1984. Ocean Salmon Fisheries Off the Coast of Washington,Oregon, and California. Federal Register 49(158):32414-32423.Pollnac, R. B. and S. Littlefield. 1984. Evaluating fishing success.Ocean Development and International Law Journal 12:63-70.Reiger, G. 1977. Native fish in troubled waters. Audubon 79(1):18-41.Reiger, H. A. and W. L. Hartman. 1973. Lake Erie's fish community:150 years of cultural stress. Science 180:1248-1255.Robins, C. R., R. M. Bailey, C. E. Bond, J. R. Brooker, E. A.Lachner, R. N. Lea, and W. B. Scott. 1980. A list of common andscientific names of fishes from the United States and Canada.Fourth Edition. Am. Fish. Soc. Spec. Publ. 12.Tyler, A. V., and V. E Gallucci. 1980. Dynamics of fished stocks.Pages 111-147 in R. T. Lackey and L. A. Nielson, eds. FisheriesManagement, Halsted Press, New York, NY.Wilson, J. A. 1982. The economical management of multispeciesfisheries. Land Economics 58(4):417-434.
